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INTRODUCTION 
Appellees Ronald C. Barker and Larry Whyte (hereafter "Attorneys"), pursuant 
to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, respectfully submit this Petition for 
Rehearing. This Court should grant the Petition for the reason that Rule 56 U.R.C.P., 
in conjunction with Rule 4-501(2) U.C.J.A., required Appellant (hereafter "Harline"), 
as a party opposing Attorneys' motion for summary judgment, to come forward with 
affirmative evidence in support of each element of his claim on which he bears the burden 
of proof. This Court acknowledged and reaffirmed this rule of law when it stated that 
"To avoid summary judgment, Harline must establish some competent evidence to 
support each element of his legal malpractice claim." Opinion, attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A", at p. 3 (citation omitted). Yet of the four elements of Harline's legal malpractice 
claim, there is no record evidence supporting three of those elements. Any supposition 
about what a juror might ultimately do at trial ignores the fundamental failure of 
Harline's case below — Harline came forward with no admissible or material evidence 
upon which a reasonable juror could find for him. 
In the Opinion, this Court identified and reaffirmed many important principles 
relating to legal malpractice actions and standards for summary judgment. Yet in 
reversing the trial court's finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact, this 
Court overlooked or misapprehended Harline's factual record and applied correct legal 
principles in a factual vacuum. In other words, while summary judgment should be 
reversed when a reasonable juror might view the evidence and find in favor of the party 
opposing summary judgment, that evidence must have been brought forward in opposition 
to summary judgment. Harline brought no evidence forward to the trial court on three 
essential elements to his claims. Because Harline failed to do this, and because this Court 
incorrectly assumed that there was admissible record evidence upon which a juror could 
deliberate, this Court should rehear the matter and affirm the lower court's ruling in favor 
of Attorneys. 
FACTS 
Most of the salient facts are articulated and set forth at pages 1-3 of the Opinion, 
and are incorporated herein. However, one "fact" set forth in the Opinion is not 
supported by the record, and likely flows from the unwarranted presumptions about the 
factual record that serve as the basis for the Opinion. On page 2 of the Opinion, after 
pointing out that Attorneys had represented Harline in his bankruptcy without reviewing 
the docket, this Court stated that M[a]s a consequence [of that failure, Attorneys] filed no 
amendments to Harline's deficient bankruptcy schedules, nor did they advise Harline to 
amend his schedules." This statement is speculation, and nothing in the record suggests 
that Harline's failure to amend his fraudulent and false schedules was a "consequence" 
of Attorney's acts or omissions. 
In addition to those facts set forth in the Opinion, other facts bear upon this appeal, 
particularly on its procedural posture, and should be considered with this Petition. 
1. All non-expert discovery in the case was to have been concluded by June 
3, 1991, more than a month before the summary judgment hearing. (R. at 240). 
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2. In their Reply Memorandum, Attorneys argued to the trial court that, "there 
are no facts which Harline and his counsel have asserted or could assert to change the 
fact that Defendants never had a legal duty to amend the schedules and statements in 
Harline's bankruptcy." (R. at 150-151) 
3. In their Supplemental Memorandum in support of their motion, Attorneys 
pointed out to the trial court that Harline was obligated to come forward with supporting 
evidence. "Discovery is over. Harline's opportunity to amass evidence supporting his 
claims has passed, and he must come forward, now, with evidence supporting each of the 
elements of his claims against [Attorneys]. Harline's failure to produce evidence now, 
in opposition to Defendants' motion, should compel this court to grant summary judgment 
in favor of Defendants." (R. at 250). 
4. Harline had retained an expert witness, Herschel Saperstein, before the 
hearing on Attorneys' motion for summary judgment (R. at 240), but presented no 
evidence by way of deposition or affidavit from Mr. Saperstein. As a result, there was 
a complete failure of proof on Harline's essential elements of establishing the standard 
of care and a breach of that standard. 
5. Harline presented no record evidence to the trial court in support of the 
proximate causation element of his claims. In other words, Harline presented no 
evidence to suggest that even if Attorneys had persuaded Harline to file amended 
schedules, the bankruptcy court would have elected to ignore Harline's admittedly 
3 
fraudulent conduct towards his creditors and the bankruptcy court and granted a 
discharge. 
6. In their Statement of Facts as to Which No Genuine Issue Exists, set forth 
pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(a) U.C.J.A., Attorneys pointed out that Harline's denial of 
discharge was caused by the bankruptcy court's finding that Harline had acted 
fraudulently before and after his bankruptcy filing. (R. at 247-249). 
7. Harline did not set forth any factual averments, supported by citations to the 
record, disputing Attorneys' statement that it was Harline's fraudulent conduct that caused 
the denial of his discharge. Therefore, Attorneys' allegation of causation was undisputed, 
and deemed admitted under Rule 4-501 (2)(b) U.C.J.A. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Attorneys readily acknowledge the standards to be applied to summary judgment 
motions. In particular, Attorneys acknowledge that if there is a genuine issue of fact, 
summary judgment is inappropriate. There was no genuine issue of fact presented to the 
trial court because Harline submitted no evidence to create such an issue. This Court 
framed the key issue as follows: 
The question we must focus upon is if defendants had 
persuaded Harline to amend his schedules to include the 
prefiling, gratuitous transfers, the Merrill Lynch account, the 
partnership interest, and correctly state his address, a 
reasonable juror could conclude the court would have allowed 
the discharge. 
Opinion at 11. 
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The reason why this Court should rehear this matter is simple: No reasonable 
juror could conclude that an amended schedule would have persuaded the bankruptcy 
court to allow a discharge in the absence of some evidence that the court would have 
ruled differently. Harline came forward with no evidence on that issue, and so there in 
nothing for a juror to deliberate on. Further, Attorneys' statement on the causation issue 
was undisputed, and therefore admitted. Harline failed to meet his burden of proof, and 
his case should be dismissed. 
Harline also failed to present the necessary expert testimony in support of two 
other elements essential to his case, existence of duty and breach thereof. In the Opinion, 
this Court stated that Attorneys "for the first time on appeal claim summary judgment 
was appropriate because Harline failed to produce expert testimony that defendants had 
breached their standard of care." Opinion at 4, n. 2. This Court overlooked or 
misapprehended the fact that at the trial court, Attorneys argued that Harline did not have 
any evidence to support his claims that Attorneys breached their duties to him, expert or 
otherwise. This Court's refusal to acknowledge this fatal omission in Harline's case 
ignores the whole premise to Attorneys' motion, i.e., Harline had no evidence supporting 
essential elements of his claims. Describing the kind of evidence Harline failed to offer 
does not recategorize Attorneys' argument into one that was not presented to the trial 
court. It was. 
This Court has acknowledged the necessity of expert testimony to establish the 
essential elements of standard of care and breach in a professional malpractice action. 
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Opinion at 4, n. 2; Wvcalis v. Guardian Title or Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n. 8 (Utah 
App. 1989). Harline was apparently aware of this requirement since he retained the 
services of a prominent bankruptcy attorney, Herschel Saperstein, to testify as an expert. 
Yet the record contains no evidence in the form of an affidavit of or deposition by Mr. 
Saperstein establishing the appropriate standard of care or the alleged breach thereof. 
Without that required evidence, summary judgment was appropriate. For this Court to 
rule that Attorneys' motion fails because they did not label the evidence Harline needed 
to establish his case is at odds with the policies behind Rule 56 and the adversary system. 
If a party is required to educate opposing counsel on the precise nature of evidence the 
other party must present, a party's burden of proof will be reduced to meeting only 
specific objections to proof. Dismissals short of a Ml trial on the merits will only be 
appropriate when plaintiff fails to satisfy an evidentiary checklist supplied by opposing 
counsel. That is not the law. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF 
CAUSATION, HARLINE'S CLAIMS FAIL. 
In the Opinion, this Court correctly stated that Harline had to establish "some 
competent evidence" in support of each of his claims to avoid summary judgment. 
Opinion at p. 3. This is consistent with other decisions of this Court, and with the 
policies behind Rule 56. See, e.g., Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 
640 (Utah App. 1988) ("[N]on moving party's failure of proof concerning one essential 
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element of that party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.") (citing to 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317 (1986)); and Dvbowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 
775 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah App. 1989) ("We conclude that [plaintiff] has failed to raise any 
material issues of fact beyond a 'bare contention' that [Defendant] was somehow 
negligent. That being the case, the trial court properly granted summary judgment 
against her."). 
The U.S. Supreme Court's standard for summary judgment under Federal Rule 56, 
apparently adopted in Utah, makes clear that Harline, with the burden of proof on 
causation, would be obligated to come forward with evidence on the causation issue. 
But we do not think the Adickes language quoted above 
should be construed to mean that the burden is on the party 
moving for summary judgment to produce evidence showing 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with 
respect to an issue on which the non-moving party bears the 
burden of proof. Instead, as we have explained, the burden 
on the moving party may be discharged by "showing" - that 
is, pointing out to the District Court - that there is an 
absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. 
Celotex. 477 U.S. at 325 (emphasis added). Here, Attorneys did just as the U.S. 
Supreme Court suggested, pointing out that discovery was over and that Harline had no 
record evidence supporting his claims. When Attorneys pointed this out, the burden 
shifted to Harline to come forward with admissible evidence. Harline did not do so. 
Also, Harline's failure to dispute, with record evidence, Attorneys' Statement of 
Undisputed Facts that Harline's denial of discharge was caused by Harline's conduct 
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constitutes an admission under Rule 4-501 (a) (b) U.CJ.A. Thus, the causation issue was 
determined in favor of Attorneys. 
In Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987), 
this Court affirmed summary judgment in the absence of proof on the causation issue. 
Similarly here, while this Court may entertain speculation about what the bankruptcy 
court may have done if Harline had amended his schedules, Harline produced no evidence 
from which a juror could infer a different result. There is no evidence tending to show 
what the bankruptcy judge would have done if Harline had amended his schedules. 
Harline had the obligation as the plaintiff to present competent evidence on this causation 
issue. Harline failed to do this. To suggest that a reasonable juror would be permitted 
at trial to guess as to what the bankruptcy court may have done 5 years ago, in response 
to an amendment to schedules that only confirmed Harline's admittedly fraudulent 
conduct, would permit jurors to speculate on causation without any evidence before them. 
That is not the law. 
The Utah Supreme Court faced a nearly identical situation in Dunn v. McKay, 
Burton, McMurrav & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894 (Utah 1978). There, the court was asked 
to determine whether the trial court was correct in granting the defendants' motion for 
directed verdict. The plaintiffs husband had filed for divorce in Florida. Plaintiff 
retained the defendants to file a divorce action in Utah. Defendants filed a divorce action 
in Utah but were unsuccessful in obtaining personal service on the husband. Defendants 
obtained an order allowing for service in Florida by mail. However, instead of having 
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the clerk mail the summons and complaint as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the defendants mailed the summons and complaint themselves. This apparently led to a 
delay in the Utah proceedings. The plaintiff claimed that the delay in the Utah divorce 
proceedings caused her to lose custody of her two children and to incur the expense of 
retaining legal counsel in Florida. 
In affirming the directed verdict, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs own 
conduct and voluntary decision resulted in her children moving from Utah to Florida. 
Furthermore, the Court found that it was mere conjecture as to what would have 
happened to the children had there been no delay in the Utah divorce action, i.e., there 
was no evidence to suggest the Utah court would have awarded plaintiff custody. Based 
on these findings, the Court affirmed the directed verdict on the ground that there was 
no evidence showing damage to the plaintiff proximately resulting from the defendants' 
conduct. Id. at 897. 
[T]he problem of more critical import, and which we see as 
controlling in this case, is whether the trial court was correct 
in ruling that the plaintiffs evidence failed to establish a 
cause of action because it showed no damage to the plaintiff 
proximately resulting from [the attorney's] conduct. 
A finding of such damages cannot properly be based on 
speculation or conjecture. They can be awarded only if there 
is a basis in the evidence upon which reasonable minds acting 
fairly thereon could believe with reasonable certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury and damage and also that it was 
proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant. 
Id. at 896 (footnotes omitted). In other words, assuming there was no attorney 
negligence, it nevertheless would have been pure conjecture for a jury to guess at whether 
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the Utah court would have granted the plaintiff custody of her children, particularly when 
she voluntarily sent the children to live with their father in Florida. 
This is precisely the question presented in this appeal. Even if this Court assumes 
that Attorneys had a duty to question their client's veracity, discover the falsity of his 
schedules and the fraudulent nature of his pre-petition and post-petition conduct, and 
assuming they persuaded Harline to amend his schedules, what evidence did Harline 
produce in opposition to Attorneys' motion that the bankruptcy court would have ruled 
in Harline's favor? The answer is none. To hold that this issue was ripe for submission 
to a jury would simply allow a jury to guess at what the bankruptcy court might have 
done. Such guesswork does not amount to the kind of evidence "upon which reasonable 
minds acting fairly thereon could believe with reasonable certainty." Id. 
For the plain reason that a reasonable juror could not conclude that an amendment 
to Harline's admittedly fraudulent schedules would have changed the bankruptcy court's 
mind about Harline's entitlement to a discharge in bankruptcy, this Court should rehear 
the matter and affirm the trial court's order of summary judgment. 
B. HARLINE'S FAILURE OF PROOF ON DUTY AND BREACH IS FATAL TO 
HIS CLAIMS. 
It is undisputed that Harline failed to provide the trial court with any evidence, 
expert or not, in support of his claims that Attorneys had certain duties to Harline and 
that they breached those duties. It is also undisputed that as a matter of law, expert 
testimony is required to prove these essential elements of Harline's claims. In just such 
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a situation, this Court affirmed a summary judgment because plaintiff failed to come 
forward with expert testimony. In Robinson, supra, this Court agreed with an appellate 
court in Illinois and stated, 
Where, however, the record indicates that plaintiff has [had] 
every opportunity to establish his case and has failed to 
demonstrate that he could show negligent acts or omissions . 
. . [on the part of the] defendant by expert medical testimony, 
where the issue is clearly one which cannot be determined by 
laymen alone, summary judgment could be allowed. 
740 P.2d at 267, quoting Chiero v. Chicago Osteopathic Hosp., 392 N.E.2d 203, 211 
(111. App. 1979). 
Here, this Court refused to consider Attorney's "expert witness" argument on 
appeal because it was arguably raised for the first time. Such a ruling misapprehends the 
fundamental premise and theory underlying Attorneys' motion. Harline did not come 
forward with any evidence to support the duty and breach elements essential to his claim. 
As this Court has held, no evidence, other than expert testimony, would satisfy Harline's 
legal obligations to come forward with admissible evidence in support of his duty and 
breach claims. Thus, Harline's failure to come forward with expert testimony evidence 
is fatal to his claims. 
To hold that Attorneys are barred from arguing this fatal omission in Harline's 
case because they did not say the word "expert" in front of the trial court places form 
over substance. Harline came forward with no evidence on these issues, let alone expert 
evidence. The real question is whether Harline was deprived of an opportunity to defeat 
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Attorneys' summary judgment motion because Attorneys did not educate him as to the 
quality of evidence Harline needed to present on the standard of care elements. He was 
not prejudiced. Harline was put on notice that he had to come forward with admissible 
evidence supporting each of the essential elements of his claim. The burden was then on 
Harline to determine what kind of evidence he should come forward with to establish 
material issues of fact. He came forward with none. Therefore, this Court may 
appropriately affirm the trial court because Harline failed to come forward with evidence 
supporting his standard of care elements. 
Finally, that Harline was on notice of his legal obligation to come forward with 
expert testimony is established by the fact that he had retained an expert bankruptcy 
attorney to appear as a witness. That he chose not to use Mr. Saperstein by submitting 
an affidavit or other form of expert opinion in opposition to Attorneys' motion was 
Harline's election. The only "newness" to Attorneys' argument on appeal is the 
characterization of the evidence with which Harlme failed to come forward in any event. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellees respectfully request that this Court grant their 
Petition for Rehearing, and affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
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BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Dr. Wesley Harline appeals the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in his legal malpractice action against Ronald 
Barker and Larry Whyte (defendants). He also appeals the court's 
refusal to compel defendants to respond to interrogatories. We 
reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Harline, 
against whom the summary judgment was entered. See Swift Stop, 
Inc. v. Wight, 845 P.2d 250, 250 (Utah App. 1992). In February 
1986, Harline filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition with the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. Prior to filing 
for bankruptcy, Harline made several gratuitous property 
transfers to family members. He did not identify these transfers 
when filing his bankruptcy schedules. Harline also did not 
include an account he had with Merrill Lynch. Additionally, his 
bankruptcy schedules failed to note his interest in a profit-
sharing plan. Harline received funds from his Merrill Lynch 
account after his petition was filed. He used these funds for 
personal expenses without court approval. 
On October 29, 198 6, after Harline's bankruptcy had been 
converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding, the bankruptcy court ordered 
Harline to amend his bankruptcy schedules by November 18, 1986. 
On November 14, 1986, Bettie Marsh filed a motion to withdraw as 
counsel for Harline. For purposes of this appeal, defendants 
concede they represented Harline sometime before November 14, 
198 6, during the period Harline's bankruptcy schedules should 
have been amended. Harline never told defendants of any 
deficiencies in his schedules or of an amendment deadline. 
Defendants never inquired about outstanding court orders, nor did 
they consult with former counsel, Bettie Marsh, about the status 
of Harline's bankruptcy proceedings. In fact, defendants did not 
look at the docket sheet of Harline's bankruptcy proceedings 
until the fall of 1987. Thus, defendants were not aware of the 
court's order to amend Harline's schedules. As a consequence, 
defendants filed no amendments to Harline's deficient bankruptcy 
schedules nor did they advise Harline to amend his schedules. 
On August 10, 1988, the bankruptcy court denied Harline 's 
discharge in bankruptcy. The court identified Harline's 
prefiling gratuitous property transfers, his interest in and use 
of funds from the Merrill Lynch account, his failure to document 
his property transactions in his schedules, and his failure to 
disclose the profit-sharing plan, as the basis for denying the 
discharge. 
On July 10, 1989, Paul Cotro-Manes entered his appearance as 
Harline7s counsel in Harline's bankruptcy proceedings. On April 
26, 1990, Harline filed amended bankruptcy schedules which 
identified his interest in his profit-sharing plan. The 
bankruptcy court allowed Harline to amend the schedules to 
include this plan. Harline claimed his interest in this profit-
sharing plan should be exempt from creditors. The bankruptcy 
trustee sued to secure Harline's interest in the profit-sharing 
plan as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. 
On November 9, 1990, the bankruptcy court ruled the money in 
the profit-sharing plan was not exempt and should be available to 
Harline's creditors. The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Utah affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. The Tenth Circuit 
reversed and remanded the case, holding the exempt status of 
Harline's interest in his profit-sharing plan was dependent on 
unresolved legal and factual issues. In re Harline, 9 50 F.2d 
669, 676 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied sub nom. Gladwell v. 
Harline, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 2991 (1992). 
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Based on these facts, defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment. In the motion defendants claimed (1) they did not 
breach their duties as attorneys, and (2) they were not the cause 
of the court's refusal to grant Harline a discharge. The trial 
court granted summary judgment. 
Harline appeals claiming material factual issues exist. 
Harline argues defendants breached their duty in representing him 
and that defendants' breach caused the court to deny his 
discharge.1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we 
review the facts in the light most favorable to the losing party, 
while giving no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions." Swift Stop. 845 P.2d at 252. "^Summary judgment 
is appropriate if the pleadings and all other submissions show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" 
Atkinson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 798 P.2d 733, 734 (Utah 1990), 
cert, denied, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 970 (1991) (quoting Heglar 
Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980)); see 
also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
I. LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
The elements of legal malpractice include: (1) an attorney-
client relationship; (2) a duty of the attorney to the client; 
(3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages suffered by the client 
proximately caused by the attorney's breach of duty. Williams v. 
Barber, 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988). See also Breuer-Harrison, 
Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716, 727 (Utah App. 1990). To avoid 
summary judgment, Harline must establish some competent evidence 
to support each element of his legal malpractice claim. See 
1. In addition, Harline claims there is a factual issue as to 
whether defendants represented him during the time the schedules 
should have been amended. Defendants concede they represented 
Harline during this time for purposes of this appeal. Thus, this 
factual issue is eliminated. 
Furthermore, Harline claims defendants failed to amend his 
schedules such that his profit-sharing plan could be considered 
and found exempt. This claim has no merit. The bankruptcy court 
subsequently allowed the schedules to be amended and the profit-
sharing issue was considered on the merits. 
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Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 740 P.2d 262, 267 
(Utah App. 1987). 
A, Breach of Duty 
Defendants claim they had no duty to amend Harline's 
bankruptcy schedules under the undisputed facts before the trial 
court. They argue because Harline originally filed false 
schedules and did not make them aware of the deficiencies in his 
schedules nor of the court's order requiring amendment that they 
had no duty to either amend the schedules or advise Harline to 
amend the schedules.2 Harline counters that defendants breached 
their duty to him by failing to investigate the status of his 
schedules and the need to amend them. 
Once an attorney-client relationship is established, the 
attorney's duty is to ,nuse such skill, prudence, and diligence 
as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and 
exercise in the performance of tasks which they undertake. '" 
Williams, 765 P.2d at 889 (quoting Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 
689 (Cal. 1961), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 987, 82 S. Ct. 603 
(1962)). We must decide whether, on the facts before the court, 
defendants breached this duty of care owed to Harline.3 
2. Defendants for the first time on appeal claim summary 
judgment was appropriate because Harline failed to produce expert 
testimony that defendants had breached their standard of care. 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n.8 (Utah App. 
1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (1990) (acknowledging expert 
testimony must ordinarily be presented to establish standard of 
care in cases dealing with duties owed by a particular 
profession); see also Brown v. Small, 825 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Mont. 
1992) (holding expert testimony is ordinarily required in legal 
malpractice cases to establish the standard of care). We refuse 
to consider this issue for the first time on appeal because 
Harline was never given the opportunity to respond to this issue 
before the trial court, nor was the trial court given the 
opportunity to consider it. See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 
887 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
3. Defendants argue this case poses a duty question rather than 
a breach of duty question. Defendants frame the issue as "Did 
attorneys have a duty to amend the schedules?" We disagree. 
Duty is a broader question. The duty of defendants was to 
represent Harline with "competence and diligence." The question 
is whether they breached that duty by failing to amend the 
schedules. 
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Ordinarily, whether a defendant has breached 
the required standard of care is a question 
of fact for the jury. Consequently, a motion 
for summary judgment should be denied where 
the evidence presents a genuine issue of 
material fact which, if resolved in favor of 
the nonmoving party, would entitle him to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A genuine 
issue of fact exists where, on the basis of 
the facts in the record, reasonable minds 
could differ on whether defendant's conduct 
measures up to the required standard. 
Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982) (citations and 
footnote omitted). 
In Jackson, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded a 
summary judgment in favor of an attorney in a legal malpractice 
action. Id. In that case, the client retained the attorney to 
prevent a foreclosure sale of her home. At the attorney's 
suggestion, the client obtained $4 00 to be used in settling the 
creditor's $800 judgment. Several days before the sale the 
client took the $400 to the attorney's office. The attorney told 
the client the opposing attorney had agreed to stop the 
foreclosure sale in exchange for the $400. The attorney did 
nothing further to prevent the foreclosure. The court held there 
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the attorney's 
conduct amounted to a breach of the standard of care. Id. 
In an earlier legal malpractice case, Young v. Bridwell, 437 
P.2d 686 (Utah 1968), clients sued their attorney for failing to 
advise the clients of their right to appeal after the trial court 
had ruled against them. The Utah Supreme Court held that if it 
was established the trial court had ruled in a manner 
manifestly against the general law on the 
subject . . . and this fact was discoverable 
upon reasonable professional research by 
counsel, upon such a showing a duty 
conceivably might arise on the part of 
counsel at least to so inform his client 
. . . . However, in this case there is no 
such established error giving rise to the 
duty of counsel to advise his client of the 
right to appeal. Counsel is required to 
possess the ordinary legal knowledge and 
skill common to members of his profession, 
but is not required to know all of the law, 
nor to second guess the trial judge. 
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Id. at 690. Thus, counsel is required to undertake the research 
which a reasonable attorney under the circumstances would do. 
Id. Accord Williams. 765 P.2d at 889. 
In another setting the supreme court has recognized an 
attorney can rely on the factual representations of his client. 
In Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974), stock 
purchasers sued the seller's accountant and attorneys to recover 
the loss of value of the stock. The court dismissed the 
purchasers' complaint holding they could not recover from the 
attorneys absent a showing of acts or omissions on the part of 
the attorneys which amounted to a breach of duty. 
In the usual case an attorney acts upon the 
information furnished by his client, in 
carrying out his work. As a general rule, an 
attorney is not required to investigate the 
truth or falsity of facts and information 
furnished by his client, and his failure to 
do so would not be negligence on his part 
unless facts and circumstances of the 
particular legal problem would indicate 
otherwise or his employment would require his 
investigation. 
Id. at 808. Thus, absent special circumstances indicating 
otherwise, attorneys can rely on their client's representations. 
We now examine the facts before the trial court on summary 
judgment to determine if the court correctly decided that no 
reasonable fact finder could conclude defendants had breached 
their duties to Harline. Harline knew of the deficiencies in his 
schedules and also knew of the order to amend. However, he did 
not inform defendants of these facts. Defendants did not inquire 
of their client or prior counsel, nor review the record of the 
bankruptcy proceedings to determine if there were outstanding 
court orders which needed attention. Based upon these facts, we 
conclude that a reasonable juror could find that not doing any 
investigation shows a lack of diligence and competence on the 
part of defendants. 
The investigation required in this setting falls under the 
rule discussed in Milliner. In Milliner, the court said 
attorneys can rely on the truth of their clients' statements 
without investigation and not be negligent, unless the 
circumstances dictate otherwise. Here the circumstances of the 
recent change of counsel could lead a reasonable fact finder to 
determine that subsequent counsel should have obtained the docket 
sheet or met with former counsel to see if there were outstanding 
orders, or discussed the status of the schedules with their 
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client. Thus, the court's summary judgment cannot be affirmed on 
the basis that defendants, as a matter of law, did not breach 
their duty to Harline. 
B. Proximate Cause 
Defendants assert that even if reasonable minds could differ 
as to whether they breached their duty to Harline, their breach 
did not cause him harm. They contend Harline caused his own 
damage by filing false schedules at the inception of the 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
Proximate cause is an issue of fact. Swift Stop, Inc. v. 
Wight, 845 P.2d 250, 253. Thus, only if there is no evidence 
upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary 
judgment appropriate. Id. 
Proximate cause is "x[t]hat cause which in natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, 
produces the injury and without which the result would not have 
occurred.'" Xd. (quoting Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 
(Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 n.3 (Utah 
1984))). In a legal malpractice action this standard can be 
distilled to the following: The client must show that if the 
attorney had adhered to the ordinary standards of professional 
competence and had done the act he failed to do or not done the 
act complained about, the client would have benefited. See Young 
v. Bridwell, 437 P.2d 686, 690 (Utah 1968); Swift Stop, 845 P.2d 
at 252. Stated another way, lf[i]n a legal malpractice action, 
proximate cause embraces an assessment of the merits of the 
underlying cause of action."4 Williams, 765 P. 2d at 889. 
In Swift Stop, this court partially reversed and remanded a 
summary judgment in a legal malpractice action holding there were 
material issues of fact regarding the proximate cause of the 
injury. The attorney was sued for legal malpractice based on his 
representation of the plaintiff in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceeding. The plaintiff asserted several claims of malpractice 
arising from the representation including: (1) the attorney 
stipulated, without the plaintiff's authorization, that a debt 
owed to a bank was not dischargeable in the bankruptcy; and (2) 
4. Similarly in Young, the court states "in order to make out a 
cause of action against the attorney for failing to advise [the 
clients] of their right to appeal, it would have to be shown that 
there was at least a reasonable likelihood of reversing the 
judgment" and that it would have benefited the clients. Young, 
437 P.2d at 689. 
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the plaintiff instructed the attorney to propose a 100% repayment 
plan and the attorney failed to do so. 
This court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment on the first issue concluding that the plaintiff failed 
to show the attorney's stipulation caused the plaintiff harm. We 
concluded the administrative debt was not dischargeable in 
bankruptcy thus, the stipulation caused no harm. Therefore, even 
if the attorney had not done the act complained of the plaintiff 
would not have prevailed. However, we determined there were 
material issues of fact as to whether the failure to submit the 
100% repayment plan caused harm to the plaintiff. We therefore 
reversed and remanded on this issue. 
Further, in Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurrav, & Thurman, 584 
P. 2d 894 (Utah 1978), the court found the plaintiff's own actions 
caused her loss. The plaintiff appealed a directed verdict in 
favor of her attorney in a malpractice action based on her 
divorce. The client sued for loss of custody of her children and 
the cost of legal counsel in Florida. She claimed the attorney 
failed to mail the summons properly and therefore failed to 
obtain service over her former husband, a resident of Florida. 
The court held the loss of custody and the need for retained 
legal counsel in Florida would have occurred even if the summons 
had been properly mailed. The court concluded it was the 
plaintiff's own actions in sending the children to stay with 
their father in Florida that caused her loss. Thus, the actions 
of the attorney did not cause her damages. 
We must decide whether a reasonable juror could conclude 
that if defendants had advised Harline to amend his deficient 
schedules and assisted him in doing so, the bankruptcy court 
would have granted his discharge. If no reasonable juror could 
conclude an amendment to the schedules would have helped Harline 
avoid the denial of his discharge, then summary judgment was 
appropriate.5 
5. Defendants argue equitable estoppel bars Harline from 
claiming they caused him harm. The elements of equitable 
estoppel are: 
(i)[A] statement, act, or failure to act by 
one party inconsistent with a claim later 
asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction 
by the other party taken or not taken on the 
basis of the first party's statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii) 
injury to the second party that would result 
from allowing the first party to contradict 
(continued...) 
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The bankruptcy court based its denial of discharge on 
section 727(a)(2) and (4) of the Bankruptcy Code which provides: 
The court shall grant the debtor discharge, 
unless 
• • • • 
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud a creditor or an 
officer of the estate charged with 
custody of the property under this 
title, has transferred, . . . or has 
permitted to be transferred . . . 
(A) property of the debtor, 
within one year before the date of 
filing of the petition; or 
(B) property of the estate after 
the date of filing of the petition; 
• . . a 
(4) the debtor knowingly or 
fraudulently, in or in connection with 
the case: 
(A) made a false oath or account. 
U.S.C.A. § 727(a) (1980). 
The bankruptcy court found the following profiling, 
gratuitous property transfers violated section 727(a)(2)(A): 
Harline's December 18, 1984 transfer of an Olympus Heights 
property to family members without consideration; a January 3, 
1985 transfer of an Ogden condominium project property to family 
members without consideration; a January 5, 1985 transfer of 
Lambs Canyon property to family members without consideration; a 
5. (...continued) 
or repudiate such statement, act, or failure 
to act. 
Ceco Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 
(Utah 1989) (citations omitted). Defendants claim Harline's 
knowledge of the deficient schedules and his lack of 
communication of those deficiencies constitute a failure to act 
and the defendants reasonably relied on that inaction. 
Equitable estoppel as a matter of law is not present. Even 
though Harline may have failed to act by not telling his 
attorneys about the order to amend, we cannot say as a matter of 
law that it was reasonable for defendants not to independently 
review the bankruptcy file. Thus, we cannot say that defendants' 
reliance upon Harline/s omission was reasonable as a matter of 
law. 
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January 3, 1985 transfer of an Iowa Street property to family 
members without consideration. 
The court further found Harline violated section 
727(a) (2) (B) when he sold his stocks held in a Merrill Lynch 
account and then used in excess of $38,000 of the proceeds for 
his personal benefit. Additionally, the court found Harline had 
violated section 727(a)(4)(A) by filing a false oath when he did 
not properly document the above transfers in his schedules. 
Finally, the court found he had filed false schedules under 
section 727(a)(4)(A) by listing an incorrect address and failing 
to disclose an interest in a partnership. 
Ruling from the bench on the section 727(a) violations the 
bankruptcy judge stated: 
Intent can be inferred from the 
circumstances. A Court may look to all of 
the surrounding facts and circumstances and a 
continuing pattern of wrongful behavior is 
one indicator of fraudulent intent. 
Similarly, reckless indifference to the truth 
is an indication of fraudulent intent under 
§ 727[(a)](2). The fact that valuable 
property has been gratuitously transferred 
raises a presumption that such transfer was 
accompanied by the actual fraudulent intent 
necessary to bar a discharge under 
§ 727[(a])(2). With these facts that I found 
and with these principles of law in mind, I 
conclude as follows. Wesley G. Harline 
signed the statement of affairs and schedules 
under oath and he knowingly misstated the 
place of his residence which was contrary to 
the testimony at trial. He knowingly 
misstated the fact he had owned no 
partnership interest within six years. That 
he made no transfers within one year of 
filing and he knowingly misstated his then 
ownership of $38,000 interest in the Merrill 
Lynch account. 
. . . . 
Wesley G. Harline made a false oath when 
he signed the statement of affairs, when he 
signed the oath to schedules A and B and this 
oath was made knowingly and fraudulently. 
My findings as to intent to hinder, 
delay or defraud creditors and knowing and 
fraudulent false oath are made because of the 
significant number of wrongful acts and the 
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reckless indifference to the truth showed by 
Wesley G. Harline. 
The sheer weight of the evidence gives 
rise to the inescapable conclusion that 
Wesley G. Harline acted knowingly and with 
the intent to avoid paving creditors with the 
intent to conceal property or to place 
property beyond the reach of creditors. 
(Emphasis added). 
The question we must focus upon is if defendants had 
persuaded Harline to amend his schedules to include the 
prefiling, gratuitous transfers, the Merrill Lynch account, the 
partnership interest, and correctly state his address, a 
reasonable juror could conclude the court would have allowed the 
discharge. 
Certainly an amendment would have removed the section 
727(a)(4)(A) ground for denial of discharge as the schedules 
would no longer be false. However, the more difficult question 
is whether an amendment would allow a reasonable juror to 
conclude the judge would have changed his section 727(a) (2) (A) 
and (B) fraudulent property transfer basis for denial of 
discharge. The bankruptcy court judge stated his delay and 
defraud findings under section 727(a)(2)(A) and (B) are "because 
of the significant number of wrongful acts and the reckless 
indifference to the truth." If Harline had amended the schedules 
thereby disclosing his questionable dealings, the bankruptcy 
court judge might have come to a different conclusion regarding 
Harline7s intent to defraud. Thus, we cannot say a reasonable 
juror could not conclude that Harline may have been granted a 
discharge had the schedules been amended. We therefore cannot 
say that the court's summary judgment was proper. 
II. MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
Harline made a motion to compel and overrule objections to 
answer certain interrogatories involving the designation of 
witnesses at trial. The trial court denied the motion on July 1, 
1991. The basis for the denial of the motion is unclear. 
Because the motion may well have been denied based on the pending 
summary judgment motion, we remand the issue for reconsideration. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment must be reversed because a reasonable 
juror could conclude that had defendants amended or advised 
Harline to amend his deficient schedules the bankruptcy court 
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would have granted his discharge. Further, because we cannot 
determine the basis for the court's denial of the motion to 
compel, we remand the issue for reconsideration in light of our 
reversal of the summary judgment. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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